

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7964
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USBERLIN
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AMEMBASSY PARIS
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AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMCONSUL MUNICH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 07596

USEEC

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEPR, PGOV, UR, GW
SUBJECT: BREZHNEV VISIT TO FRG

REFS: (A) BONN 6876; (B) MOSCOW 7540; (C) BONN 6398
NOTAL

SUMMARY: THE FRG EXPECTS LITTLE IN THE WAY OF CONCRETE
RESULTS FROM THE BREZHNEV VISIT. GERMAN OFFICIALS,
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HOWEVER, HOPE THEIR TALKS WITH THE SOVIET LEADER WILL
HAVE A POSITIVE SPILLOVER EFFECT ON GERMAN RELATIONS
WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND PARTICULARLY ON THE SITUATION
IN BERLIN. NEITHER SIDE APPARENTLY PLANS ANYTHING
SPECTACULAR. THE GERMANS WILL MAKE ECONOMIC COOPERATION,
AND TO A LESSER EXTENT, BERLIN, THE FOCAL POINTS OF
THEIR PRESENTATION. THE SOVIETS ARE EXPECTED TO SHARE

THE FRG'S INTEREST IN ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND TO
EMPHASIZE SECURITY ISSUES, INCLUDING THE ERW.
END SUMMARY.

1. SETTING: OFFICIAL BONN AWAITS THE BREZHNEV VISIT
WITH GREAT ANTICIPATION AND MODEST EXPECTATIONS. THE
FRG IS MAKING A PRESS EFFORT TO PLAY DOWN PROSPECTS
FOR THE VISIT. THIS IS, IN PART, A REALIZATION THAT THE
MORE PRODUCTIVE, HIGHLY VISIBLE PHASE OF OSTPOLITIK IS A
THING OF THE PAST. THIS VISIT, AS WAS THE CASE WITH
OTHER RECENT GERMAN-EASTERN EUROPEAN SUMMIT EXCHANGES,
WILL NOT RESULT IN A FLOW OF SIGNED AGREEMENTS OR
GRANDIOSE PROJECTS.

A JOINT POLITICAL STATEMENT AND A TECHNICAL COMMUNIQUE
WILL BE SIGNED AND AN ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT WILL
PROBABLY BE CONCLUDED AS WELL. OTHER THAN THAT, THERE
LIKELY WILL BE LITTLE IN THE WAY OF SIGNING CEREMONIES
THAT WILL GIVE THE VISIT A PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF CONCRETE
PROGRESS. CLEARLY, HOWEVER, FRG-SOVIET RELATIONS ARE OF
FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE NOT ONLY TO BOTH COUNTRIES BUT
ALSO TO THE FUTURE OF BERLIN AND TO BONN'S RELATIONS
WITH EASTERN EUROPE, PARTICULARLY THE GDR. SEEN FROM
THIS CONTEXT, THE VISIT TAKES ON GREAT SIGNIFICANCE AS
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR BONN TO WORK FOR A MORE POSITIVE
SOVIET ATTITUDE IN THESE AREAS.
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2. THERE ARE SEVERAL FACTORS WHICH CAUSE THE GERMANS TO
LOOK UPON THE VISIT WITH MIXED FEELINGS. AMONG THESE
IS THE FACT THAT THEY WILL BE DEALING WITH AN
INTERLOCUTOR WHOSE DAYS AT THE HELM ARE NUMBERED.
SENIOR OFFICIALS, IN FACT, FOR A TIME SEEMED CONVINCED
THAT BREZHNEV'S HEALTH WOULD PRECLUDE A VISIT AT ALL.
NOW, THEY FACE THE PROSPECT OF DISCUSSING A RELATIONSHIP
WITH A MAN WHOSE DEPARTURE FROM THE SCENE SEEMS
INCREASINGLY IMMINENT, AND WHOSE SUCCESSOR CANNOT BE
EVALUATED WITH ANY DEGREE OF CERTAINTY.

3. MOREOVER, THERE IS HARDLY A COMMON APPROACH TO THE
VISIT WITHIN THE GOVERNING COALITION. SPD LEADERS SUCH
AS BRANDT, BAHR, AND WEHNER ARE STAUNCH ADVOCATES OF
"MOVEMENT" IN OSTPOLITIK. THEY BELIEVE OSTPOLITIK HAS
STAGNATED UNNECESSARILY UNDER GENSCHER'S STUBBORN
TUTELAGE. THEY FEAR THAT THIS STAGNATION COULD BE THE
DEATH KNELL OF OSTPOLITIK AND THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO
PUSH HARD FOR GERMAN POSITIONS, OR CONCESSIONS THAT
MIGHT RESULT IN NEW IMPULSES IN GERMAN-SOVIET RELATIONS.

4. IN ADDITION, WE NOTE A DIVERSION FROM FRG POLICY IN THE APPROACH TAKEN BY EGON BAHR ON THE ENHANCED RADIATION WARHEAD (ERW) DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW. THAT POLICY, AS ELABORATED PARTICULARLY BY GENSCHER (PARA 13), HAS BEEN TO CALL FOR SOVIET

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USEEC

RESTRAINT -- AS ON THE SS-20 OR ON TANK DEPLOYMENT --
IN EXCHANGE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MOVE TO DEFER A
PRODUCTION DECISION ON ERW. BAHR, HOWEVER, CRITICIZED
THIS POSITION DURING AN INTERVIEW WITH GERMAN NEWSMEN
IN MOSCOW, SAYING IN ESSENCE THAT THE SOVIETS COULD NOT
BE EXPECTED TO ACCEPT THE "NEUTRON BOMB" AS AN OBJECT OF
NEGOTIATIONS.

5. GENSCHER, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAS STATED THAT SOVIET
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RESTRAINT IS NOW CALLED FOR. THE FOREIGN MINISTER IS A
PROPONENT OF A FIRMER POSITION ON SOVIET DEMANDS, HAVING
FOR EXAMPLE, MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE WILL BE NO GIVE
ON THE QUESTION OF INCLUDING BERLIN IN THE THREE
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS. SCHMIDT, WHOSE PERSONAL
PREDILECTIONS PROBABLY PLACE HIM SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THE
TWO CAMPS, WILL BE UNDER CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL PRESSURE
FROM BOTH SIDES. HE WILL HAVE TO BALANCE THE PRESSURES
FROM WITHIN HIS OWN PARTY AGAINST THE REQUIREMENTS OF
HIS COALITION. THE BAHR VISIT TO MOSCOW, WHICH WOULD
HAVE HAD AT LEAST THE SANCTION OF THE CHANCELLOR, IS
INTRIGUING AS A POSSIBLE INDICATION OF THE DIRECTION
IN WHICH SCHMIDT MAY BE LEANING. WELL-CONNECTED SOURCES
HAVE ASSURED US, HOWEVER, THAT THE ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF
THE BAHR VISIT WAS AS ADVERTISED: TO REPRESENT BRANDT
IN DISCUSSION OF NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES, AND NOT TO SERVE
AS ADVANCE MAN FOR THE BREZHNEV VISIT.

6. THE TONE THE GERMANS WILL TAKE VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS
WILL BE DETERMINED NOT ONLY BY DOMESTIC POLITICAL
ELEMENTS BUT ALSO BY THEIR PERCEPTIONS OF THE US-SOVIET
RELATIONSHIP. MUCH WILL, OF COURSE, DEPEND ON THE
RESULTS OF SECRETARY VANCE'S RECENT DISCUSSIONS IN
MOSCOW. REGARDLESS OF THE GERMAN PERCEPTION OF US-SOVIET
RELATIONS FOLLOWING THOSE DISCUSSIONS, HOWEVER, BONN IS
LIKELY TO BE CAREFUL NOT TO EXACERBATE US-GERMAN
DIFFERENCES BY APPEARING TOO ACCOMMODATING VIS-A-VIS
MOSCOW. FOR THEIR PART, THE SOVIETS HAVE ON OCCASION
IN THE PAST SOUGHT TO INTENSIFY THEIR DIALOGUE
WITH THE GERMANS WHEN RELATIONS WITH THE US ARE NOT
PROCEEDING SMOOTHLY. THESE SAME PERCEIVED US-GERMAN
DIFFERENCES MAY MOTIVATE THE SOVIETS TO
INTENSIFY THEIR LONG-STANDING EFFORTS TO DRIVE A WEDGE
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BETWEEN THE ALLIES.

7. A FURTHER FACTOR COMPLICATING MATTERS FOR THE
GERMANS IS THEIR CONCERN THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL DECISION
ON ERW AND THE RESULTING POLITICAL ATTACKS ON THE
PRESIDENT MAY CAUSE THE SOVIETS TO PERCEIVE A WESTERN
ALLIANCE IN DISARRAY. OFFICIALS HERE ARE CONCERNED

THAT THIS WILL WEAKEN THEIR OWN POSITION VIS-A-VIS
THE SOVIETS.

8. BERLIN: THE GERMANS PLAN TO KEEP BERLIN OUT OF THE
FOREFRONT AND HAVE DOWNPLAYED ITS ROLE IN THE VISIT IN
BACKGROUND PRESS BRIEFINGS. IN FACT, BERLIN IS THE
TOUCHSTONE OF GERMAN RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS AND THE
CITY WILL PLAY A PROMINENT ROLE IN THE TALKS (REF A).

9. SCHMIDT AND GENSCHER ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE SOVIET
ATTITUDE TOWARD BERLIN AND SPECIFICALLY OVER WHAT THEY
SEE AS A NARROWING INTERPRETATION BY MOSCOW OF THE
QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT (QA). A CHANCELLERY SOURCE
INFORMS US THAT SCHMIDT HOPES TO HAVE A HEART-TO-HEART
TALK WITH BREZHNEV ON BERLIN -- IDEALLY, WITHOUT THE
PRESENCE OF GROMYKO, WHO IS SEEN HERE AS THE HARD-LINER.
SCHMIDT PLANS TO EXPLAIN THE FRG POSITION ON THE QA,
MAKING IT CLEAR THAT SOVIET SUSPICIONS THAT BONN IS
SEEKING TO EXPAND THE FEDERAL ROLE IN BERLIN ARE
UNFOUNDED. THE GERMANS BELIEVE BREZHNEV IS INFORMED
POORLY ON SUCH MATTERS BY GROMYKO AND, WHILE THEY DO NOT
EXPECT ANY CONCESSIONS OR MARKED SOVIET SHIFTS ON BERLIN,
THEY WISH TO CLARIFY THEIR OWN POSITION WITH THE SOVIET
LEADER. SCHMIDT WILL ALSO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT RECENT
SOVIET ACTIONS HAVE UNDERMINED HIS CONFIDENCE IN
MOSCOW'S ADHERENCE TO THE QA. HE WILL ALSO TRY TO
AMELIORATE SOVIET CONCERNS REGARDING FRG-GDR RELATIONS.

10. NO PROGRESS IS EXPECTED ON THE TECHNOLOGICAL
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COOPERATION AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS WHICH ARE
HELD UP BECAUSE OF SOVIET REFUSAL TO PERMIT OFFICIALS
FROM FEDERAL INSTITUTES IN BERLIN TO PARTICIPATE IN
CONTEMPLATED EXCHANGES. THE GERMANS WILL MAKE NO
PROPOSALS CONCERNING EITHER AGREEMENT AND THEY HAVE

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USEEC

SEEN NO EVIDENCE OF ANY GIVE IN THE SOVIET POSITION.

11. ECONOMIC COOPERATION: THE GERMANS HAVE TOLD US THEY PLAN TO MAKE THE ECONOMIC AREA THE CENTERPIECE OF THE VISIT. THEY WILL SEEK TO STRENGTHEN THEIR ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS AND PUT IT ON A MORE SOLID POLITICAL FOOTING. THE FRG HAS REPORTEDLY FORMULATED A PROGRAM OF CONCRETE PROPOSALS TO INCREASE SOVIET-FRG ECONOMIC COOPERATION. WHILE THE DETAILS ARE CONFIDENTIAL

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NOT YET AVAILABLE (WE WILL COVER THEM IN A SEPTEL), THE PLAN IS SAID TO CALL FOR AN INCREASED NUMBER OF LARGE JOINT PROJECTS AND AN EXPANSION OF COOPERATION AGREEMENTS BETWEEN MIDDLE-SIZED GERMAN FIRMS AND SOVIET STATE ENTERPRISES.

THE GERMANS HAVE MADE SOME PROGRESS IN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS BUT THE EXPECTATIONS CREATED BY THE BREZHNEV VISIT IN 1973 HAVE NOT BEEN FULFILLED. AFTER AN INITIAL SIZEABLE INCREASE, TRADE STAGNATED SOMEWHAT LAST YEAR. THIS IS IN PART ATTRIBUTABLE TO

SOVIET DIFFICULTIES IN FINANCING HARD CURRENCY TRADE, THE GROWING SOVIET DEBT, AND MOSCOW'S INCREASING INSISTENCE ON COMPENSATION DEALS. THERE ARE MANY SKEPTICS HERE REGARDING THE PROSPECTS FOR A SURGE IN GERMAN-SOVIET ECONOMIC COOPERATION.

12. SCHMIDT IS ALSO EXPECTED TO RAISE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WITH BREZHNEV. HE WILL CERTAINLY DISCUSS THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE, REPEATING HIS FAVORITE THEME OF GREATER SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT AID TO THE THIRD WORLD.

13. SECURITY ISSUES: THE FUTURE OF ERW LOOMS LARGE AS AN ISSUE DURING THE FORTHCOMING VISIT. THE OUTLINES OF BOTH SIDES' POSITIONS ARE CLEAR. THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO LEAVE OPEN THE PRODUCTION OPTION HAS NOT REDUCED THE DRUMFIRE OF SOVIET CRITICISM AND, AS EMBASSY MOSCOW HAS NOTED (REF B), BREZHNEV MAY SEE THE POSTPONEMENT AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A DIALOGUE ON ERW WITH THE GERMANS. THE FRG, PRESUMABLY WILL BE SUBJECTED TO A STRONG SOVIET PITCH NOT TO PERMIT DEPLOYMENT SHOULD THE US OPT FOR PRODUCTION. THE GERMANS, ON THE OTHER
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HAND, WHILE INSISTING THAT ERW IS NOT A PRIMARY TOPIC FOR DISCUSSION SINCE A DECISION TO PRODUCE RESTS WITH WASHINGTON, MADE CLEAR THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL DECISION MUST BE RECIPROCATED BY SOVIET RESTRAINT ON, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SS-20 OR IN MBFR. THEY WILL CARRY THIS ARGUMENT TO THE SOVIETS DURING DISCUSSIONS HERE. THE SOVIETS HAVE ALREADY CRITICIZED FRG CALLS FOR SUCH RESTRAINT AND THIS HAS SEEMINGLY INTRODUCED A CONTROVERSIAL NOTE INTO THE OTHERWISE POSITIVE SOVIET MEDIA PRESENTATION OF THE VISIT.

14. CHANCELLERY SOURCES TELL US THAT SCHMIDT WILL RAISE HIS STRONGLY HELD CONCERNS ABOUT THE SS-20 AND ABOUT "GRAY AREA" WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN GENERAL. WITH THE WEST'S INITIATIVE ON MBFR ON THE TABLE, THE GERMANS SEE THEMSELVES IN THE HAPPY POSITION OF BEING ABLE TO SIT AND AWAIT SOVIET VIEWS. UNSSOD IS ALSO EXPECTED TO BE A MAJOR SUBJECT OF EXCHANGES ON DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS.
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